This paper addresses the problem of robust clock phase offset estimation for the IEEE 1588 precision time protocol (PTP) in the presence of delay attacks. Delay attacks are one of the most effective cyber attacks in PTP, as they cannot be mitigated using typical security measures. In this paper, we consider the case where the slave node can exchange synchronization messages with multiple master nodes synchronized to the same clock. We first provide lower bounds on the best achievable performance for any phase offset estimation scheme in the presence of delay attacks. We then present a novel phase offset estimation scheme that employs the Expectation-Maximization algorithm for detecting which of the master-slave communication links have been subject to delay attacks. After discarding information from the links identified as attacked, which we show to be optimal, the optimal vector location parameter estimator is employed to estimate the phase offset of the slave node. Simulation results are presented to show that the proposed phase offset estimation scheme exhibits performance close to the lower bounds in a wide variety of scenarios.
the proposed POE scheme under various scenarios in the presence of delay attacks. Simulation results show that the proposed POE scheme performs better than the conventional POE schemes available in the literature and exhibits a mean square estimation error close to the lower bounds in a wide variety of scenarios.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we briefly discuss PTP and the considered problem statement. In Section III, we describe the EM-algorithm used for identifying the attacked links and the mixture components, along with the optimal approach for fusing information from multiple master nodes which are unattacked and the pdfs are all estimated correctly. In Section IV, we give some numerical results highlighting the performance of the proposed approach. Finally in Section V, we present our conclusions.
II. PROBLEM FORMULATION
In this section, we briefly describe the two-way message exchange mechanism employed in PTP, along with the considered problem statement. We assume the slave node can exchange synchronization messages with N master nodes synchronized to the same clock. Assuming a total of P rounds of two-way message exchanges between the slave and each master node; the following sequence of messages are exchanged between the i th master node and the slave during the j th round of message exchange. The master node initiates the exchange by sending a sync packet to the slave at time t 1ij . The value of t 1ij is later communicated to the slave via a follow up message. The slave node records the time of reception of the sync message as t 2ij
and sends a delay req message to the master at time t 3ij . The master records the time of arrival of the delay req packet at time t 4ij and this value is later communicated to the slave using a delay resp packet. This procedure can be mathematically modeled as [5] , [19] - [20] u ij = d i + δ + w 1ij ,
where u ij = (t 2ij − t 1ij ) and v ij = (t 4ij − t 3ij ) in (1) and (2) . δ denotes the unknown phase offset between the master and slave node clocks, d i is the unknown fixed delay at the i th masterslave communication link, {w 1ij , w 2ij } represent the random queuing delays in the forward-and reverse-path respectively. The random queuing delays {w kij } P j=1 have a pdf given by f ki (w) for i = 1, 2, · · · , N and k = 1, 2. To launch a delay attack at the i th master-slave link, a malicious node adds a finite amount of constant delay to either the forward or reverse path, so we have
where the variable τ i represents the magnitude of the delay attack 2 . When the i th master-slave link is not attacked, the forward-path delay u ij has a pdf given by f u ij (u ij |d i , δ) = f 1i (u ij −d i −δ)
which depends on the unknown parameters d i and δ. When the i th master-slave link is attacked,
Similarly, the reverse-path delay v ij has a pdf given by
depending on the unknown parameters d i and δ. In this paper, we model the random queuing delays in the backhaul networks as a mixture of Gamma random variables to allow a very general representation which fits data from realistic simulations well [14] - [16] . This approximation is useful in scenarios where we do not have complete knowledge of the queuing delay distributions and we want to estimate with a model with only a few parameters. So we have
for i = 1, 2, · · · , N . In (5) and (6) 
l=1 represent the corresponding unknown parameters of the Gamma distributions. Let Θ denote the vector containing the desired parameter to be estimated δ, the set of unknown fixed delays
, the set of unknown delay attack magnitudes for the master-slave
, the set of unknown mixing coefficients
, and the set of unknown binary state variables {η i } defined shortly. We have
where
The i th element of η is 1 if the i th master-slave link is attacked, otherwise it has a value 0 indicating that the link is not attacked. Let u and v denote the vectors of all the forward and reverse observations at the slave node. We can represent them by
and
In our work, we seek an estimatorδ(y) of the phase offset δ based on the observations y which are generally effected by all the deterministic parameters in Θ. We characterize the performance ofδ(y) via the conditional mean squared error (MSE) metric defined as
where E {.} denotes the expectation operator.
III. ATTACK IDENTIFICATION AND DATA FUSION
In this section, we develop our robust approach. First, we present the optimum scheme for fusing information exchanged with the various master nodes when we know which master-slave communication links are attacked. The approach employs our previous results on unattacked links and on when to use data from attacked links in general estimation problems. To pull together these ideas, a modified EM algorithm for identifying the links which have been attacked incorporates our developed theory on fusing the attacked and unattacked data. We first present an important theorem, which we use for the remainder of this paper. As a consequence of Theorem 1, we see that discarding the observations from the attacked links does not affect the performance of an estimator of the phase offset δ.
A. Genie approach
Let's assume that we have prior knowledge of the master-slave links which have been attacked, as well as complete knowledge of the forward-and reverse queuing delay pdfs f 1i (w) and f 2i (w)
for all N master-slave links i = 1, 2, · · · , N . Following Theorem 1, we discard the observations from the attacked links. We employ the unattacked minimax optimum estimator presented in [5] to present an approach which can provide a very useful but generally unachievable genie lower bound on the performance of estimating δ in our general problem. We first present some definitions and results from [5] . 
for some N × M matrix G, and function f 0 (.), such a problem is referred to as a vector location parameter problem [5] .
Definition 2. We say that an estimator g(x) of c T θ is shift invariant if for the same matrix G used in (20) ,
The conditional MSE of an estimator g(x) of c T θ can be written as
and the maximum MSE is defined as
While the conditional and maximum MSE are in general different for an estimator, it was shown in [5] that for a shift invariant estimator they are equal. Guruswamy et. al [5] derived a useful optimum estimator for the vector location parameter estimation problem without any attacks.
The optimum estimator is presented below for convenience.
Theorem 2. For the vector location parameter problem, the estimator
satisfies the following properties:
• g * (x) is shift invariant. In fact, all the estimators used in practice for POE are shift invariant.
• g * (x) minimizes the maximum MSE for any estimate c T θ.
• Among all estimators of c T θ that are shift invariant, g * (x) achieves the minimum conditional MSE.
• g * (x) is unbiased, i.e., E g
For proof, see [5] .
The estimator g * (x) presented in (24) of c T θ is optimum in terms of minimizing the conditional mean-squared estimation error over all values of the unknown parameters among shift invariant estimators. In this paper, we use the optimum vector location parameter estimator presented in Theorem 2 along with the result from Theorem 1 to get a lower bound on the MSE for a POE scheme in the presence of delay attacks.
If we have prior information regarding the links which have been attacked, Theorem 1 tells us to only retain information from the unattacked links. Without loss of generality, let us assume that the K master-slave links indexed by {n k } links can be represented as
From (3) and (4), we can represent y K as
T represents the vector of unknown parameters and w K is a random
The matrix G is given by
where 1 KP×1 represents a vector of size KP × 1 with all the elements equal to 1, A KP×K = 1 P×1 ⊗ I K×K , with ⊗ representing the Kronecker delta product, and I K×K represents an identity matrix of size K. We observe that (28) has a pdf which can be represented as
Assuming the components of the vector w in (28) are independent and identically distributed,
So our problem of fusing known-attack-status information from multiple master nodes falls under the class of vector location parameter estimation problems. Therefore, we use the optimal estimator given in Theorem 2 to obtain the phase offset estimate.
In our problem, we have
By applying Theorem 2, we can then obtain the optimum estimator of δ from the observations y K aŝ
We refer to the estimator presented in (32) as the genie-optimum estimator. The genie optimum estimator gives us a lower bound on the MSE for a POE scheme in the presence of delay attacks.
We use this bound to evaluate the performance of our proposed POE scheme.
B. EM-algorithm
In practice, we do not have prior information regarding the links which have been attacked.
It is necessary to identify these links before applying the optimal estimator presented in (32).
In our work, we use the EM algorithm combined with the random relaxation proposed in [17] for identifying these links. For ease of notation, we define h a,b (w|θ
where θ 1 and θ 2 represent unknown deterministic parameters. The log-likelihood function of Θ evaluated using the observed data y is given by
Recall η i represents an unknown deterministic binary variable. Based on the power of a post processing (to be discussed later) which is able to undo this modification, we introduce a relaxation that essentially replaces each η i with a real valued variable
which represents the probability of the i th link being attacked. Let
The log-likelihood function of Θ π given the observed vector y is given by
A maximum-likelihood estimate of Θ π can then be obtained usinĝ
We use the EM algorithm to evaluate (35) to get the maximum likelihood estimateΘ π . We 
where L(Ω π |z, r, s, y) is defined as
where y is defined in (18) , and χ z ij represents the indicator function defined as
The expected log-likelihood function Q(Θ π |Θ g π ) can then be expressed as
where a
ijkl and a
ijkl are defined as
2) M-step: After we calculate the expected log-likelihood with respect to the unknown data, we update the value of the vector parameterΘ π by maximizing the expected log-likelihood
We havê
We first solve the maximization problem to updateπ i , we have
Solving the above equation, we get the updated estimate of π i aŝ
ijkl .
To estimate the mixing coefficientα ik , we introduce the Lagrange multiplier with the
, and solve the equation
We then have
Summing over k on both sides, we can find the value of λ. We have
So, the updated estimate is given bŷ
Following a similar process for β il , we can get the updated estimate ofβ il aŝ
Calculating the just described updates for all the N master-slave links, we obtain the updated estimate ofα andβ. An updated estimate ofΨ can be obtained by solving the equation
In order to solve (53), we use the Newton-Raphson method to get an updated estimate of the parameterΨ. We choose the initial point as Ψ (0) =Ψ g . We then update the value at the (t + 1) th stage usinĝ
T and κ t ∈ (0, 1) is the t th step-size computed using a backtracking line search [21] . Repeating the calculation in (54) untilΨ (t) converges, the limit is a solution for (53).
The convergence analysis for the EM algorithm appears in [22] . By iteratively alternating between the E-step and M-step, we obtain the maximum-likelihood estimate of Θ π . We then classify the links based on the converged value ofπ. Specifically, we declare the i th master-slave link as attacked if π i > (1 − π i ), else we declare the link as unattacked. Following Theorem 1, we discard the observations from the attacked links. We then use the estimated values ofâ 1 ,b 1 ,â 2 , b 2 ,α andβ in the optimal estimator presented in (32) to estimate the phase offset δ. As our problem is not necessarily convex, proper initialization of the various parameters is crucial for the EM algorithm to ensure convergence to the global minimum instead of a local minimums.
We present a simple ad-hoc approach in Section III-C for initializing the parameters for the EM algorithm. We observe from simulations that the proposed ad-hoc scheme seems to avoid local minimums. The complete algorithm is summarized in Section III-D.
C. Initialization for the EM-algorithm
We now present a simple ad-hoc approach to fix the initial values of Θ π denoted by Θ 2) Initialization of a
The queuing delay pdf in the forward path is given by (5). Since we have prior information regarding the mean (µ 1i ) and variance (σ 2 1i ) of the queuing delay distributions, we have
Solving the above equations, we can get our estimate of {a
l=1 . Following a similar procedure for the reverse path, we obtain {a
l=1 . This procedure is repeated for all the master-slave communication links in both the forward-and reverse path to get a
2 , and b
3) Initialization of π: We use the POE scheme proposed in [20] in our ad-hoc scheme to initialize π (g) . The POE scheme presented in [20] , referred to as an L-estimator is based on a linear combination of the order statistics. These POE schemes offer near optimal performance and only require information regarding the mean and covariance matrix of the queuing delays 3 . The steps to fix π (g) are as follows:
• We determine the relative phase offsetδ i for all the N master-slave communication links using the L-estimators.
• Since less than half of the master-slave links are attacked, the median of these N phase offsets should correspond to a phase offset estimate which is unattacked. We represent this value byδ med .
• Representing the root mean sqaure error of the phase offset estimate determined by the median as σ medP (See (73) in Appendix). If we observe that δ med −δ i ≥ 2σ medP , we declare the link as attacked, else we declare the link as unattacked.
4) Initialization of δ:
We fix the value of δ (g) asδ med . 
If the i th master-slave link is identified as attacked, we have
This procedure is repeated for all the master-slave communication links to get d (g) and
D. Final Algorithm
The steps of the proposed POE scheme is presented in this section. We repeat the algorithm until the difference between the complete data log likelihood at consecutive iterations becomes less than some threshold. 2: Initialize the present value of the log likelihood LLF pres using (34) and Θ (g) π .
3: Initialize the previous value of the log likelihood LLF prev = −∞ and fix a threshold value to determine when to stop. 4 : while |LLF pres − LLF prev | ≥ do 5:
compute a
ijkl using (40) based on current estimate Θ (g) π .
7: end for 8:
update the current estimate ofπ i using (44).
10:
end for
11:
update the current estimate ofα ik using (51).
13: end for
14:
update the current estimate ofβ il using (52). 16: end for 17: Update the current estimate ofΨ by solving (53).
18:
Update LLF prev ← LLF pres .
19:
Update Θ Update the log likelihood LLF pres using (34) and the updated Θ 
Identify the i th master-slave communication link as attacked. In summary, we use the EM algorithm for identifying the master-slave communication links which have been subject to delay attacks, and employ the optimal vector location parameter estimator to estimate the phase offset of the slave node.
IV. SIMULATION RESULTS
In this section, we evaluate the performance of the proposed POE scheme under various network scenarios. We compare the performance of the proposed POE scheme to other conventional robust POE schemes available in the literature along with the lower bounds presented in Section III.
A. Generating the random queuing delays
We follow the approach given in [5] , [20] for generating the random queuing delays in the backhaul networks. We assume a Gigabit ethernet network consisting of a cascade of 10 switches between the master and slave node. Each switch is assumed to be a store-and-forward switch that implements strict priority queuing. We mainly consider the background cross traffic flows.
In cross traffic flows, fresh background traffic is injected at each switch along the masterslave path, and this traffic exits the master-slave path at the subsequent switch [see 3-switch example in Fig. 1 ]. The arrival times and sizes of background traffic packets injected at each switch were assumed to be statistically independent of traffic at other switches. In the context of LTE backhaul networks, the traffic generated by other users of the network can be typically we use Traffic Models 1 (TM1) and 2 (TM2) from the ITU-T recommendation G.8261 [23] for cross traffic flows, as described in Table I . For the load factor, i.e., the percentage of the link capacity consumed by background traffic, we consider values between 20-80% of the link capacity. We assume that the interarrival times between packets in all background traffic flows follow exponential distributions, and set the rate parameter of each exponential distribution to obtain the desired load factor [5] . Empirical pdfs of the queuing delays, shown in Fig. 2 , were obtained using a custom MATLAB-based network simulator. Our simulations assumed that all switches were store-and-forward switches that implemented strict priority queuing. In our simulations, we consider scenarios where the distribution of queuing delays in the forward and reverse paths are symmetrical and equal for all the master-slave communication links, i.e.,
B. Approaches from the literature employed for comparison
We now describe the various approaches that we compare in our simulations:
1) Genie optimum approach: In this POE scheme, we have prior knowledge of the links which have been attacked, and discard the information from these links. The phase offsetδ(y)
is then estimated using (32). We should mention here that this approach gives a bound on the best achievable performance of a POE scheme.
2) EM minimax approach-I: In this POE scheme, we have prior knowledge of the density functions of the queuing delays. We try to identify the links which have been attacked using the EM algorithm, and fuse information from the unattacked links using (32).
3) EM minimax approach-II: In this POE scheme, we try to identify the links which have been attacked as well as the mixture components of the queuing delays using the EM algorithm, and fuse information from the unattacked links using (32).
4)
Fault-tolerant algorithm approach: This POE scheme was proposed in [9] . In this scheme,
we have prior knowledge regarding the number of attackers (say M ). We first calculate the phase offset estimate for each of the individual master-slave links (using the sample mean), and we discard the M lowest and M largest values of the phase offset, and form the estimate ofδ(y) from the remaining links deemed to be non-faulty.
5) Median approach:
This POE scheme was proposed in [10] . In this scheme, we first estimate the phase offset for each of the individual master-slave links (using the sample mean). We then estimateδ(y) as the median of estimated phase offsets from the N master-slave links.
C. Simulation results
We carried out simulations for various network scenarios under both TM-1 and TM-2 for different loads and for various sample sizes. In our simulations, the delay attack magnitude for each attacker is chosen uniformly from the interval [0.5, 2.0] [−2.0, −0.5] µs. The results are presented in Figure 3 -4. In the case of 20% load, under both TM-1 and TM-2, we approximate the queuing delay distribution by an exponential random variable (Gamma distribution with shape parameter as 1), while for the remaining cases, we approximate the queuing delay distribution by a 2-component Gamma mixture. As we can see from the results, the proposed POE scheme performs quite well under all scenarios and is relatively close to the genie optimum estimator under both network models. We briefly discuss the results:
1) In Figure 3 , we study the case of N = 3 with one master-slave communication link being attacked under TM-1 for different loads. The proposed POE schemes perform significantly better than the median and fault tolerant algorithm (FTA) approaches under various loads.
We also observe that there is no noticeable difference in performance between the median and FTA approaches. This is mainly due to the fact that in both these approaches, the smallest and largest phase offset estimates are discarded in this particular scenario.
2) In Figure 4 , we study the case of N = 3 with one master-slave communication link being attacked under TM-2 for different loads. In this scenario, we see a noticeable gain in performance for the proposed POE scheme under low loads (20% and 40%), while at high loads all the POE schemes exhibit an estimation error close to the lower bounds. This could be due to the queuing distributions approximating a Gaussian distribution under high loads in TM-2. In such a scenario, the sample mean becomes the optimum method for fusing information from multiple master-slave communication links.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have provided a useful lower bound on the MSE for any phase offset estimation scheme in the presence of delay attacks and we show approaches that provide performance close to the bound. In particular, we presented a robust POE scheme that employs the EM algorithm along with the optimal approach for fusing information from multiple unattacked master nodes when all pdfs in the model are known. The proposed scheme does not require complete information regarding the distributions of the queuing delays, performs better than the conventional schemes available in the literature and exhibits a mean square estimation error close to the lower bounds in a number of network scenarios. Furthermore, the two-way message exchange is employed in a number of synchronization protocols including NTP [2] , TinySeRSync [10] and the Timing-sync Protocol for Sensor Networks (TPSN) [25] . The proposed POE scheme can be easily modified for these protocols.
APPENDIX BRIEF DISCUSSION REGARDING THE L-ESTIMATORS
The POE scheme presented in [20] , referred to as an L-estimator is based on a linear combination of the order statistics. The general form of these estimators for estimating the phase offset in the i th master-slave communication link is given bŷ 
